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IN THE SUPREME" COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KANAWHA AND HOCKING COAL AND . : 
COKE COMPANY, ) 
vs . 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
CARBON COUNTY, a municipal j 
corporation, and CENTENNIAL : 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a ) 
corporation. i • 
Defendants-Respondents. 
CASE NO 
13853 
PETITION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
FOR REHEARTNG 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The plaintiff-appellant, Kanawha and Hocking 
Coal and Coke Company respectfully petitions the 
Court for a rehearing on its opinion filed May 6, 
1975 in the above-entitled action. The petition is 
based on the following ground. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
The Court's opinion does not mention or 
pass upon one of the legal defenses raised by the 
appellant on its appeal from the summary judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
^~ Wallace D. ttefd ^/ 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
ARGUMENT 
Analysis of the Court's opinion filed May 6, 
1975 shows that neither the majority opinion nor the 
dissenting opinion makes mention of or distinguishes 
the two different factual situations presented by the 
two tax sales. 
The plaintiff's predecessor, the Utah Fuel 
Company owned all of the acreage in fee simple. The 
majority opinion states that the tax sale of the mineral 
rights and the auditor's deed effectively severed the 
surface estate from that of the underlying minerals. 
The opinion then adopts the rule that continued pos-
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3 
session of the surface after such severance does 
not constitute possession of the minerals when un-
accompanied by any acts of dominion over the minerals. 
The opinion, however, does not differentiate 
between the factual situation presented by the 1932 
tax sale and that involved in the 1944 tax sale. On 
December 23, 1932, Utah Fuel Company deeded the sur-
face of all of the ground to Utah Grazing Lands 
Company. That company held title to the surface 
until 1950 when a reconveyance was executed to Utah 
Fuel Company. Thus, it appears that at the time of 
the 1932 tax levy, there had been no severance of the 
mineral and surface estates, while in the 1944 tax 
sale, these estates had been severed for approxim-
ately twelve years. 
As appears from the authorities cited here-
after, what appear to be the better reasoned decisions, 
make a definite distinction between the two factual 
situations. 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
This court has decided in Huntington City, a 
municipal corporation v. C. W. Peterson, 30 U2d 408, 
518 P2d 1246, that a lien for general property taxes 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4 
attaches as of January 1 of the taxable year. As 
appears from the factual statement, at the time the 
1932 tax lien attached, Utah Fuel Company owned the 
property in fee simple absolute and there had been 
no severance of the mineral and surface estates. 
It is stated in Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 
1A, Section 165 at Page 76: 
"Where the adverse possession of the 
surface commences before the mineral 
severance by the title holder, the 
adverse possession continues to own 
against the mineral severance/1 
Huddleston v. Peel, 238 Miss. 798, 
119 Southern 2d 921, 120 Southern 
2d 776; Birdwell v. American Bonding 
Company [Tex. Civil App.), 337 SW2d 
120. 
Such factual situation is illustrated in 
Payne v. Fruh Company, (N.D., 1959) 98 NW2d 27, 
where the ownership of surface and subsurface was 
in a single individual until after accrual of taxes. 
It is there held that the tax title constituted 
title to the entire land, and that possession of the 
surface under the tax title was possession of the 
minerals, even though there was a mineral convey-
ance after the date of the tax deed. 
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In 35.A.L.R. 2d, at Page 149, it is express-
ed as a general rule that: 
"Where a person is in adverse possession 
of unsevered mineral land, and the owner 
of the land, or the one in adverse pos-
session, conveys or leases the mineral 
estate, the adverse possession will 
continue in the same manner as if there 
had been no conveyance or lease." 
Following this statement are citations of cases from 
Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Texas 
and Virginia. 
Of particular interest is Wallace v. Neal, 
227 Kentucky 30, 11 SW2d 1002, (1928), which states 
that even if an oil and gas lease was sufficient to 
severe mineral and surface estates, the severance 
could not effect the defendant's possession, and 
title when continued to maturity, and could not 
suspend or toll the statute of limitations in his 
favor after it had begun to run. To the same effect 
is Rio Bravo Oil Company v. Staley Oil Company 
(1942) 138 Tex. 198, 158 SW2d 293. 
In Hunsley v. Valter, 12 I11.2d 608, 147 
NE2d 356, the opinion did distinguish between pos-
session of the surface which enured to the benefit 
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of the mineral interest where severance occurred 
after commencement of the adverse possession, and 
the general rule that if mineral and surface estates 
are severed, possession of the surface does not 
include possession of the minerals. 
CONCLUSION 
The court's opinion leaves unanswered the 
legal question as to whether possession once begun 
of surface and minerals which are unsevered will be 
interrupted by a subsequent severance of these estates. 
It is respectfully urged that this legal 
matter should have been passed upon and decided by 
the court and it is respectfully urged that a 
rehearing be granted for this purpose. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
WALLACE D. HURD 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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